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possibilities. This openness is shown, for example, in the emergent prop
erties of life and mind. But, anticipation as openness to possibilities is
simply contingency. It seems Haught's point is simply that the universe
has a contingent future. However, Haught seems to want much more
conveyed by his notion of anticipation, but what exactly is unclear. For
example, much of what Haught suggests has an Aristotelian flavor in
each existing thing being drawn to imitate an unmoved mover. This is
not the kind of theological explanation to which Haught ascribes. Yet,
there seems little in his notion of anticipation that will help him distin
guish his conclusions from such an explanation.
One way of understanding Haught's account is as a Plantingian critique
of evolutionary naturalism from within a process theological approach.
As such this is an interesting synthesis of divergent approaches to natural
theology. Whether Haught has moved that critique forward is too complex
an issue for me to treat in this review. The problems I have tried to identify
in Haught's account stem from difficulties basic to the natural theological
enterprise—from where do we obtain our theological concepts, how does
our theological language contact our everyday experience. Haught's is an
interesting attempt to deal with these difficulties.

A theism : A Very Short Introduction, by Julian Baggini. Oxford University

Press, 2004. Pp. 119. US $9.95 (paperback).
AGNALDO CUOCO PORTUGAL, University of Brasilia, Brazil
It is a short but very provocative book. The aim is to provide atheists with
a thought organizer and a handy, quick explanation of their ideas for non
atheists. This ambitious goal of defending a whole worldview in such a
short book is pursued in six chapters and a conclusion, in addition to some
references and indications for further reading.
The first and the second chapters are the most important. Chapter one
is dedicated to a clarification of what atheism is about. Baggini proposes
that we overcome the prejudice not only that atheism is evil and threaten
ing, but also that it is essentially a negative position, parasitic on postula
tions of supernatural/transcendental realities. According to him, there is
a positive stance that better characterizes the view he is defending, which
he calls 'atheist physicalism' (p. 6). According to atheist physicalism, only
the natural world exists, and the stuff of the natural world is essentially
physical, which means that spirits, souls, and ideas detached from physi
cal apparatuses are not part of the world. Baggini stresses, however, that
this position should not be taken as a form of eliminative materialism,
according to which anything that is not physical or material does not
exist. Although atheist physicalism postulates that there is only physical
matter in the universe, it also claims that out of that sole substance come
minds, beauty, love, and 'the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness
to human life' (p. 6). In summary, atheism is a form of naturalism and
physicalism rather than a negative view dedicated to denying religion.
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Chapter two makes a case for atheism in the sense above, claiming that
atheist physicalism is better supported by evidence, simpler and more co
herent than the religious worldview. For Baggini, 'evidence is stronger if
it is available to inspection by more people on repeated occasions; and
worse if it is confined to the testimony of a small number of people on
limited occasions' (p. 13). According to him, there is strong evidence in
favor of atheism while the religious worldview is generally supported
only by very weak evidence. For him, natural phenomena are all better ex
plained by naturalism, and things that remain unexplained will probably
be explained in naturalistic terms rather than by anything supernatural.
In consequence, since naturalism is the best explanation of all observed
occurrences, these provide important evidence for atheism (p. 27).
Apart from being supported more by evidence, atheist physicalism is
also simpler than the religious worldview, since it postulates the existence
of only the natural world. In addition, it is also more coherent, since 'it has
everything in the universe fitting into one scheme of being. Those who
posit a supernatural realm have to explain how this realm and the natural
one interact and co-exist' (p. 30).
Chapter three is dedicated to an outline of atheist ethics, aiming to show
not only that morality has nothing to do with God or religion, but also that
the atheist may be able to act better morally than the religious believer
since he is not tempted to do something only to avoid God's punishment.
In addition, there are many examples of important godless moralities,
such as Aristotelian ethics, consequentialism, and Kant's moral philoso
phy. As a result, Baggini maintains, there is no reason why atheists should
be thought of as amoralists.
Chapter four talks about meaning and purpose, challenging the thesis
that the meaning of life is not a problem for the religious, since God is
supposed to have created us with a purpose in mind. For Baggini, this
would just make us into a tool for somebody else's purpose, and would
not make our lives meaningful for us, since it would not include above
all our projects, needs, and desires (p. 63). Moreover, Baggini argues, the
atheist who lives this life can see more purpose in it than those who take it
as a type of preparation for another one, which would be more meaningful
(p. 65). Not only would there be no point in doing anything if we had an
eternity to live, but it is possible to see the following dilemma in the notion
of after-life: 'either the after-life is recognizably like this life, in which case
an eternal one does not look very meaningful; or it is not like this life at
all, in which case it doesn't look like the kind of life we could actually live'
(p. 70). In sum, for Baggini, life without believing in God or in an after-life
is not necessarily meaningless or without direction. Rather, he holds, it is
probably the other way round.
In chapter five there is a brief history of atheism, which attempts to show
that it is 'part of a progressive story of human culture in which superstition
is replaced with rational explanation and in which we lose the illusions of
the supernatural realm and come to learn how to live within the natural
one' (p. 90). According to Baggini, it all started with pre-Socratic naturalis
tic theories, which did not postulate anything outside nature itself in order
to understand how nature worked (p. 74). Pre-Socratic philosophers inau
gurated naturalism by shifting explanation from mythic stories to rational
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explanation in natural terms. Since naturalism is what defines atheism,
that remarkable feat by the first philosophers allows us to see atheism 'as
a part of a wider, progressive story about the development of human in
tellect and understanding' (p. 78). Although its origins can be traced to
pre-Socratic philosophy, atheism only became socially relevant after the
eighteenth century, which was certainly a kind of triumph, Baggini says,
given the universal diffusion of religion in history and human societies
(p. 81). As to the link between atheism and twentieth-century totalitarian re
gimes, the author denies there is any necessary relationship between them
if we take atheism as naturalism. He accuses religious institutions of not
having been clearly opposed to those regimes either, and postulates a non
fundamentalist view of atheism. For him, fundamentalism is a danger both
in religion and atheism.
Chapter six denies that atheism is necessarily against religion in the
sense of being violently hostile to religious activities, which is a kind of
fundamentalism. On the other hand, it is certainly against religion in the
sense of holding that religious beliefs are generally false (p. 92), a subject
already dealt with in chapters one and two. In the end, says Baggini, 'reli
gion will recede not by atheists shouting condemnation, but by the quiet
voice of reason slowly making itself heard' (p. 107).
The conclusion of the book starts with the admission that many ele
ments were left out due to the character of a short introduction and the
focus on defending atheism instead of attacking religion. Another main
purpose was to dispel a distorted image of atheism as sinister and threat
ening. For Baggini, this image is probably due to the fact that becoming an
atheist involves a difficult process of growing up: 'atheism is the throwing
off of childish illusions and acceptance that we have to make our own way
in this world' (p. 111).
As mentioned above, the book's main thesis is that atheist physicalism is more rationally grounded than the religious view, where 'rationally
grounded' is a matter of evidence, coherence and simplicity. The prob
lem of the rationality of faith has been intensely debated in contemporary
'analytic' philosophy of religion. One of the leading participants in this
debate is Alvin Plantinga, according to whose philosophy Baggini's posi
tion can be characterised as evidentialism in its classic form. According
to classic evidentialism, a belief is justified only if it is based on evidence
or is basic itself, in the sense of not being based on anything else. Among
basic beliefs, according to the classic approach, only self-evident truths
(like statements from mathematics and logic), incorrigible beliefs (about
our own mental states), or sensorily evident beliefs can be counted. As a
result, belief in God would not be basic, since it does not fit in any of these
categories. And since natural theology's arguments, which start from basic
beliefs, do not work, belief in God is irrational.
According to Plantinga, classic evidentialism faces two serious diffi
culties. First, it is inconsistent with the rationality criterion it establishes,
since its principle is a belief that neither fits in any of the classes of prop
erly basic beliefs nor is based on an argument. Secondly, if classic evidentialism is correct, then many of our common beliefs (such as that other
people have minds like ours, that tables and chairs are objects external to
our minds or that the world has existed long before we were aware of it)
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are not rational. In view of these problems, it would be better to reject the
classic evidentialism presupposed by Baggini.
The alternative Plantinga provides suggests a much richer landscape
than the desert one proposed by atheistic physicalism. In consequence, be
lief in God, for example, could be basic and thus rational in a wider form
of evidentialism. Plantinga's proposal includes a theory of knowledge to
counter the objection of being epistemologically and ontologically per
missive, that is, of accepting any kind of belief and entity as respectively
justified and existent. Plantinga puts forward the concept of warrant as a
parameter to judge the epistemic credentials of a certain proposition. In
general terms, a belief is warranted if it is produced by a properly func
tioning apparatus in adequate conditions. In W arranted Christian B elief,
Plantinga argues not only that the belief in God can be non-trivially ratio
nally justified (i.e., warranted), but also that the same holds for more spe
cific Christian beliefs. Although it is not possible to go into the details of
his approach here, and despite the fact that it is also open to critidsm—as
all interesting philosophical theories are—what we have expounded here
seems sufficient to show that Baggini's conclusion that religious beliefs are
not rational, based on the type of classic evidentialism he defends, is, at
the least, arrived at too swiftly.
As to Baggini's contention that naturalism is more rational than the reli
gious view because it is simpler than the latter, consider a thesis by Richard
Swinburne (Epistem ic Justification 2001, chap. 4), according to which sim
plicity has many facets. In other words, what is simple according to one
facet can be complex in view of another one. So, naturalism can be simpler
than the religious world view (the belief that the objects studied by the
natural sciences constitute only one of the dimensions of reality) because
it postulates just one type of reality. However, this type of reality will need
to have much more complex properties than the ones postulated by the
religious view so that 'the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness to
human life' may come out of it (p. 6). In addition, the explanation of how
a plan of intentions and values may come from a biological, chemical and
physical basis is also more complex than the theistic one, which postulates
the action of a being whose will is motivated by values.
Baggini's thesis that atheistic naturalism is also more coherent than the
religious worldview can be questioned as well. According to Plantinga,
since natural evolution's mechanisms select better fitted behaviours and
these need not be linked to true beliefs but to the most useful ones from the
point of view of survival and reproduction, atheistic naturalism cannot
justify the claim that human cognitive faculties reliably produce true be
liefs about the world. So, naturalism cannot justifiably assume that these
faculties reliably provide true beliefs, particularly the most theoretical
ones, such as the ontological thesis proposed by atheistic physicalism. As
a result, atheistic naturalism is not only incoherent, but also self-defeating
since it entails an inability to be justified as a true theory.
Apart from most of the main debate in contemporary philosophy of
religion, Baggini's book leaves out an important reference regarding the
meaning of pre-Socratic philosophy to the history of atheism. Werner
Jaeger's influential The T heology o f E arly G reek P hilosophers shows that the
first pre-Socratic philosophers were not naturalists, but the initiators of
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the metaphysical tradition and of a more sophisticated conception of God.
For the Milesian School, nature was something alive and divine. Although
in their alternative to the mythical approach to reality there are some signs
of atheist naturalism, they can also be seen as those who first proposed the
theistic metaphysical concept of God. The beginning of the rational tradi
tion, far from disposing entirely with the concept of God, was strongly
based on it. So, belief in God does not need to be taken as contradictory
to the pursuit of scientific discovery. In many cases and for many people,
including important scientists in the past and present, it can actually be a
meaningful pre-condition.
In short books with ambitious aims, missing points like the ones indicated
above are almost inevitable. This flaw is well counter-balanced by a provoca
tive, enjoyable style of presenting the ideas, and a good overview of the main
atheistic arguments. In a book of philosophy, an engaging tone is generally
an important quality. Like all short introductions, Baggini's book runs the
risk of treating its subject superficially. This is not a defect when it assumes its
role of being just a starting point for the discussion of a controversial theme.
The problem is that atheism is not subjected by him to any questioning in
its own right, as if it were immune to numerous criticisms that have been
made to it. In other words, it is doubtful whether this kind of introductory
text should be designed as a sort of intellectual defence artillery for atheists
(or for religious believers). A more neutral approach, dedicated to showing
the pros and cons of the debate involving atheism, would be more adequate.
Although it is not contrary to the alleged open-mindedness of the atheis
tic position defended by Baggini, the apologetic approach chosen sounds
a little strange, if not naive, and smacks a bit of advertising in many parts.
Considering theoretical debate the main function of a book of philosophy
(even a short one), and given the non-fundamentalist perspective adopted
by the author, this work should be recommended to the religious believer as
a means of fine-tuning his own beliefs in view of other perspectives, rather
than as a handbook to help the atheist maintain peace of mind.

R ethin kin g H um an N ature: A C hristian M aterialist A ltern ative to the Soul, by

Kevin J. Corcoran. Baker Academic, 2006. Pp. 152. $18.99 (paperback).
DAVID VANDER LAAN, Westmont College
R ethin kin g H um an N ature is an effort to bring the constitution view of per

sons to an audience of philosophy and theology students, as well as laypeople who are eager for an intellectual workout. The constitution view,
Corcoran argues, is a viable middle ground between dualism and what
he calls "nothing-but" materialism, combining in one view the theses that
human persons are not merely bodies and that humans are entirely ma
terial creatures. Throughout, Corcoran argues that the constitution view
is consistent with essential Christian beliefs and that where it parts com
pany with the bulk of the Christian tradition, the tradition's error can be
explained and the departure can be defended. As a book that brings a

